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O xford Uni versity v. R amesh wari
P hotocopy S erv ices - R eshaping
the C opyright D iscourse
Kartik Chawla*

I. I ntroduction
The central purpose of copyright law is to ensure that the creation of intangible creative works is consistently incentivised, even where the nature of
these works themselves may not quite allow for it. The ‘means’ for this are
the limited monopolies; the ‘end’, however, is that these works actually be
consumed or actually be read. It is not only the creation of these works that
is crucial, but it is also immensely crucial that the works be accessible (a
word with multiple strata of meanings) to the masses.
The Indian copyright law is not clear on whether copyright is a natural
right or a statutory creation.1 However, it is important to remember that the
justifications for copyright are based on the creation of an ‘artificial’ market
for a specific category of such intangible works through state-given sanction
for limited monopolisation.
Copyright, therefore, requires a balance between the limited monopolies
given to the authors of these works and the access given to the consumers.
However, in the last few decades, the focus and perspectives of the copyright
owner and of ‘private property’ have been dominatingly influential in copyright law. 2 This has arguably been particularly relevant due to the major
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reduction of costs involved in production and reproduction of intangible
works with the evolution of ICTs.
This essay analyses the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi
High Court in the case of University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy
Services3 from the perspective of fair use and the public domain, and the
importance of the educational exceptions in contrast with the private property and trade-centric discourse of copyright. The essay is divided into five
parts. After the introduction, the second chapter discusses the importance
of commons in the core philosophy of copyright law, and how this has
been subsumed by the private property discourse in the recent decades. The
third chapter provides a brief summary of the judgment, and then analyses
its implications in the context of these competing discourses. The fourth
chapter responds to certain critiques of the judgment. The final chapter concludes the essay, noting that the perspective taken in the judgment is a significant victory for the commons discourse over the private property discourse.
It notes that while there is a fair critique for the blow that has been dealt here
to the financial incentives for authors and publishers and we must find ways
to incorporate new methods of creating such incentives, the judgment allows
us to approach this from a commons-based perspective, which is crucial in
itself.

II. The Copyright Discourse

and the

Commons

The theories and jurisprudence of a legal regime necessarily have a quintessential structural influence on the regime in question. But, when we analyse
legal regimes closely we find that this structural influence is, in some cases,
lacking. Legal structures sometimes work without taking into account the
context and the reality adequately,4 and this lacuna can be very dangerous
to the very evolution of the law.
Copyright law is, broadly, a statutory creation intended to create artificial
incentives for the creation of more ‘intangible’ content. It is meant to protect
the rights and interests of the authors and publishers, but at the same time,
it is also meant to support the commons, 5 to support access to this content
for the masses, particularly for the purpose of education. This harkens back
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University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229.
Margaret Davies, Asking the law Question, 96 (3rd edn., THOMSON, Law Book
Company of Australia 1994).
William T. Fisher, ‘The Theories of Intellectual Property’, available at https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf (Last visited on March 31, 2017).
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to the first copyright statute itself, i.e., the Statute of Anne,6 and even the
first copyright act in the United States (US).7 The theories of copyright, in all
their variations, require a healthy, burgeoning commons.8
The commons plays an integral and often underestimated role in the copyright system.Not only is the commons necessary for ensuring that copyrighted works are more than mere inaccessible books locked behind chains
of unaffordability (in which they are helped by market competition), the
commons is also the most significant source of ‘material’ from which the
copyrightable works are drawn to begin with.
A work is considered to be in the public domain or ‘commons’ if it does
not qualify for any copyright protection at all, i.e., there is no copyright on
it, and any person can use it as he or she deems fit. ‘Fair use’, on the other
hand, carves out certain situations in which a person can make use of even
a copyrighted work, and to that extent the copyright is suspended. A key
problem in recent decades, however, has been that fair use has come to be
seen as a ‘defence’ to claims of copyright infringement, of infringement of
the ownership of private property. What is ignored here is the fact that fair
use is actually a right, an essential part of the copyright law itself. Fair use is,
in a way, the gateway to the commons, rather than a mere defence to claims
of ownership of intellectual property.
Going one step beyond the pure commons, however, we come to the
thorny condition of one of its most significant tools in fair use: “educational
exceptions”. Educational exceptions play a fundamental role in copyright
law, working as they do at the intersection of a host of societal factors. The
importance of educational exceptions for access to information and even the
right to education has been much debated and discussed.9 At the same time,
educational exceptions also cover a rather sensitive and difficult market,
with continued and consistent ‘incentivisation’ being crucial for the creation
of more significant works and with authors struggling to fully capitalise
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Lawrence Liang, The Essence of Education, The Hindu (December 13, 2016), available
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and Learning’ (TechDirt, January 15, 2014), available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140115/11022325887/copyright-week-open-access-as-antidote-to-privatizing-federally-funded-knowledge.shtml (Last visited on March 31, 2017).
Kartik Chawla, ‘Authors’ Guild v. Google – A Fair Use Victory, and a Chance for
Introspection’ (SpicyIP, November 8, 2015), available at https://spicyip.com/2015/11/
authors-guild-v-google-a-fair-use-victory-and-a-chance-for-introspection.html (Last visited on March 31, 2017).
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upon their works.10 Added to this, the Indian education scenario makes this
a particularly arduous exercise.11
However, the discourse in copyright law has largely been dominated by
the perspective of the copyright owner, by the discourse of ‘private property’,
particularly since the last few decades.12 This focus is particularly evident in
the fact that while the monopoly created by copyright has been seen as the
norm or as ‘the rule’ in the recent past, tools of the commons are defined
as the ‘exceptions and limitations’ despite strong contentions to the contrary.13 Fair use and fair dealing, in many ways and across jurisprudences, are
depicted as “defences” to infringement, and not as equal participants in the
process with private law. There has been a growing call from theorists and
from the civil society to recognise the fact that this discourse is skewed and
that the rights of the owner are not the sole or even the dominant perspective in copyright law.14 As Locke’s famous, and underused, proviso puts it, a
person may legitimately acquire property rights by mixing his ‘labour’ with
resources held in the ‘commons’ only if that leaves “enough and as good in
commons for others”.
There needs to be an active recognition of the fact that the commons is
not the result of the ‘exception and limitations’ of copyright law, but that it
is an integral part of the copyright regime per se. We need to recognise that
although copyright law is meant to protect the rights of the users and incentivise them to create more, at the same time, it is also meant to ensure that
the public in general can access these creations, particularly in the education
sector. We need to consider the commons to be as significant a part of the
copyright regime as the rights of the owners themselves.
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Prashant Reddy, ‘Counterview: The Outcome of the DU Photocopy Case isn’t Necessarily
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(Kafila Online, September 20, 2016), available at https://kafila.online/2016/09/20/
the-radical-significance-of-the-du-photocopy-case-for-global-copyright/ (Last visited on
March 31, 2017); Philip G. Altbach, Knowledge Enigma: Copyright in the Third World,
21(37) Economic and Political Weekly 1643 (September 13, 1986).
Dinusha Mendis, The Historical Development of Exceptions to Copyright and its
Application to Copyright Law in the Twenty-First Century, 7(5) Electronic Journal
of Comparative Law (2003), available at https://www.ejcl.org/75/art75-8.html (Last
visited on March 31, 2017).
Altbach, supra note 12.
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III. O xford University v. R ameshwari P hotocopy
Services – A n analysis
The copyright infringement petition in the case at hand was filed by
three publishers, Oxford, Cambridge and Taylor Francis, in August 2012
against Rameshwari Photocopy Services (a photocopy shop located on the
Delhi University campus) and the Delhi University itself. Interventions in
the case were filed by the Association of Students for Equitable Access to
Knowledge (‘ASEAK’) and the Society for Promoting Educational Access
and Knowledge (‘SPEAK’). The argument of the petitioners here was that
the creation of course packs, including the photocopying of copyrighted
materials required for the same, was an infringement of the exclusive copyright of the authors and publishers. The defendants, on the other hand,
argued that this fell within the exception to copyright provided for under S.
52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
These course packs were compilations of excerpts from academic publications, including publications from the petitioners, which were part of the
official syllabus of the Delhi University. A master copy was created by the
University from the original books that it had purchased, and photocopies
of the same where issued to the university students by the photocopy shop.
The Division Bench judgment was written by Justice Nandrajog, and
delivered by a bench comprising of Justice Nandrajog and Justice Khanna on
December 9, 2016 (‘Oxford II’). It was a decision on the appeal filed by the
petitioners in the case against Justice Endlaw’s Single Bench judgment delivered on September 16, 2016 (‘Oxford I’). The appeal judgment was delivered after what feels to be a preternaturally quick appeals process, especially
anomalous in the infamously slow Indian judicial system.15
Justice Endlaw had ruled in favour of the respondents in the case, i.e.,
Rameshwari Photocopy Services and others, stating that the photocopying
involved was covered under education exception embodied in S. 52(1)(i) of
the Copyright Act, 1957. The Single Judge Bench had found no triable issue
on fact and dismissed the case outright.
The Division Bench, in its judgment, largely concurred with the findings
of the Single Bench, but there were some crucial differences. While the Single
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Shamnad Basheer, ‘Publishers vs Pupils: Delhi High Court has Struck a Blow for the Right
to Copy Copyrighted Material’ (Scroll.in, December 13, 2016), available at https://scroll.
in/article/823996/publishers-vs-pupils-delhi-high-court-has-struck-a-blow-for-the-rightto-copy-copyrighted-material (Last visited on March 31, 2017).
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Bench found no triable issue, the Division Bench did find triable issues and
remanded the same back to the Single Bench.
The Division Bench proposed the legal issue which arise for consideration
to be: whether the right of reproduction of any work, by a teacher or a pupil,
in the course of instruction, is absolute, and not limited by the condition
of ‘fair use’. The sub-question that the Bench identified was regarding the
span of the phrase “by a teacher or a pupil in the course of instruction”. It
identified the issues regarding ‘reproduction and publication’ as sub-issues.16
It also dealt with the status of Rameshwari Photocopy as an ‘intermediary’
for the unauthorised photocopying,17 and with the question of whether the
University had given ‘official sanction’ to the photocopying.
Rejecting the arguments of the appellant-plaintiffs regarding a narrow
interpretation of ‘instruction’, the Division Bench upheld a broader reading
of the term, citing the Parliamentary debates that led to the enactment of the
2012 amendments. Vitally, in this and in rejecting the distinction between
textbooks and course packs, and throughout the judgment, the Bench takes
pains to emphasise the importance of education as a whole as well as of
access to education, particularly in the Indian context.18
While the Bench found the principle of fairness to be an essential aspect
of the copyright statute, it rather favoured the general principle of fair use
over the four-part test that was argued for by the appellant-petitioner.19 The
Bench stated that, “the fairness in the use can be determined on the touchstone of ‘extent justified by the purpose’. In other words, the utilization of
the copyrighted work would be a fair use to the extent justified for purpose
16
17

18

19

University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶17.
University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229,
¶60.
University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶28
& ¶30,
“30. The importance of education lies in the fact that education alone is the foundation on which a progressive and prosperous society can be built. Teaching is an essential
part of education, at least in the formative years, and perhaps till post-graduate level. It
would be difficult for a human to educate herself without somebody : a teacher, helping.
It is thus necessary, by whatever nomenclature we may call them, that development of
knowledge modules, having the right content, to take care of the needs of the learner is
encouraged. We may loosely call them textbooks. We may loosely call them guide books.
We may loosely call them reference books. We may loosely call them course packs. So
fundamental is education to a society – it warrants the promotion of equitable access to
knowledge to all segments of the society, irrespective of their caste, creed and financial
position. Of course, the more indigent the learner, the greater the responsibility to ensure
equitable access.(emphasis supplied)”.
University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶
31.
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of education.”20 This, in itself, is very significant as the four-part test represents a fairly private property-centric view of the exceptions to copyright
law. The purpose test, on the other hand, prioritises education and access
over market considerations, seeing the educational exceptions as more central to the copyright regime than mere ‘exceptions’.
On ‘publication’ and ‘reproduction’, the Division Bench accepted a narrower interpretation of ‘public’ with regard to the niche market for publications rather than the view taken by the Single Judge Bench.21 However, it
went on to hold that a ‘publication’ has an element of profit which it found to
be lacking, taking judicial notice of the fact that the average price for photocopies in the relevant time period was 50 paisa per page, while Rameshwari
Photocopy had agreed to charge only 40 paisa per page. It also went on to
state that if ‘reproduction’ includes the plural, it cannot be held that making
multiple copies, i.e., ‘publication’, will not be permitted. 22
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the Division Bench found the quantum of
copying to be a triable issue on facts, and remanded the same to the Single
Judge Bench.
The Court recognised the importance of the educational exceptions at
multiple occasions in the judgment, including:
“36. It could well be argued that by producing more citizens with
greater literacy skills and earning potential, in the long run, improved
education expands the market for copyrighted materials.”23

The importance given by the Court to the educational exception is put
most succinctly in one of the most famous paragraphs of this judgment:
“76. A lay person may question as to how a provision in a statute
results in an interpretation where a right conferred on a person to
use the work of another without any compensation would be just and
fair. The question would obviously arise: Is it possible that a provision in a statute partially drowns another provision. This lay person
would obviously desire, and perhaps logic would feed the desire, that

20

21

22

23

University of
33.
University of
57.
University of
57 &¶ 60.
University of
36.

Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶
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no provision should be drowned or partially drowned. After all, in the
melody of the statute all notes should be heard.
77. We therefore answer this question, which certainly arises, using
the imagery of music. A melody is the outcome of the sounds created
when different instruments, such as a lute, flute, timbale, harp and
drums are played in harmony. The notes of the instruments which
are loud and resonating have to be controlled so that the sound of the
delicate instruments can be heard. But it has to be kept in mind that
at proper times the sound of the drums drowns out the sound of all
other instruments under a deafening thunder of the brilliant beating
of the drums. Thus, it is possible that the melody of a statute may at
times require a particular Section, in a limited circumstance, to so
outstretch itself that, within the confines of the limited circumstance,
another Section or Sections may be muted. (emphasis supplied)”24

As this extract clarifies, it is at some occasions necessary for certain provisions of the statutory copyright law to be ‘muted’ so that other sections, in
this context the educational exception, can be given the overriding importance the context deserves. This interpretation of the fair use exceptions for
education clearly and strongly emphasises the importance of fair use even
over the significance of the ‘private property’ of copyright owners, in turn
emphasising the right to education over copyright ownership.
The judgment is also momentous insofar as it relies strongly on the leeway
allowed to countries under the TRIPS (The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and Berne Conventions. Whether
it has violated the same, however, is a question that has not been dealt with
herein.

IV. A R esponse

to

Critiques

One major critique of the judgment delivered by the Single Judge Bench
has been the absolute breadth of photocopying allowed under it.25 This cri24

25

University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶
76 &¶ 77.
Prashant Reddy, ‘Counterview – The DU Photocopy Case – How Wide Should Educational
Use Exceptions be in the Age of Photocopier Machines?’ (SpicyIP, September 19, 2016),
available at https://spicyip.com/2016/09/counterview-the-du-photocopy-case-how-wideare-educational-use-exceptions-in-the-age-of-photocopier-machines.html (Last visited on
March 31, 2017); Mathews P. George & Chithra P. George, ‘A Critique of Delhi High
Court Judgment in DU Photocopy Case’ (LiveLaw.in, October 6, 2016), available at http://
www.livelaw.in/critique-delhi-high-court-judgment-du-photocopy-case/(Last visited on
March 31, 2017).
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tique argues that the Court has taken too liberal an approach, and that the
narrative here had become one of binaries – either the defendants and ‘fair
use’, and access to education with them, prevailed or the petitioners prevailed, which meant that each student would be charged at the full price of
each book. 26 The argument here is that the Court could have taken a more
‘balanced’ approach. It could have perhaps delineated circumstances when
unauthorised photocopying would be allowed and circumstances for the use
of compulsory licences where access still remained a problem, or perhaps
pair a similar breadth of permission for photocopying with the University
paying the publishers through a licensing arrangement.
These criticisms raise a fair point, but they arguably fail to see the true
dearth of accessibility of education in India. This case affects not just Delhi
University, but every educational institution in the country, and directly
ties into the right to education mentioned in the Indian Constitution.
Furthermore, this critique underestimates the importance of this case in
establishing the priority of the commons-based discourse over the private
property discourse. This issue has been addressed, to some extent, by the
Division Bench judgment, as discussed below.
A second critique against both these judgments has been that the market
for academic publishing is a very small market, and paying publishers arguably nominal amounts for the creation of course packs through photocopying
would not only have been too costly on the consumer end, but could lead
to substantial benefits for the publishers and authors. 27 This would lead to
greater incentives for authors and publishers to engage with Indian scholarships, and consequently would lead to an improvement in Indian scholarship.
Of course, while the market size may not increase as a result of this judgment, it definitely is not decreasing either. This practice, of photocopying,
had been significantly widespread in India even before the judgment, which
is exactly why the judgment was considered as important as it was. However,
the concern is not simply that the status quo will be maintained, but that the
lack of this monetisation creates a disincentive for publishers in directing
their resources towards Indian scholarship, and would lead to publishing

26

27

Maanav Kumar, ‘The Copyright Imbalance in the DU Photocopy Case’ (TheWire.in,
September 29, 2016), available at https://thewire.in/69358/du-photocopy-case-not-balanced/ (Last visited on March 31, 2017).
Prashant Reddy, ‘Counterview: The Outcome of the DU Photocopy Case isn’t Necessarily
Good News for Higher Academia in India’ (SpicyIP, September 19, 2016), available at
https://spicyip.com/2016/09/counterview-the-outcome-of-the-du-photocopy-shop-isntnecessarily-good-news-for-higher-academia-in-india.html (Last visited on March 31,
2017).
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resources being diverted away from it, towards more economically feasible
markets. This, it argues, can lead to lesser competition in Indian academia. 28
The answer to this critique is slightly roundabout. First, while the critique
proposes a nominal charge for photocopying and the publishers in this case
did ask for a nominal amount, there is a strong argument to be made that
this amount would not have remained nominal if left to the free market.
Setting this amount by judicial diktat would also be possible, but would lead
to its own set of complications29 – issues of pricing are arguably some of the
most complicated ones in Intellectual Property law.
Second, is the balance I referred to earlier, between access and incentivisation. The publishing market is inherently skewed against third world
countries in many ways, and India faces substantial problems in ensuring
access to education for its 1.2 billion strong population, particularly due
to its socioeconomic stratification. A 2012 study shows that the absolute
costs of books are often higher in the global ‘South’ than the global ‘North’,
and consumers in the ‘South’ have to contribute significantly higher proportions of their income to buy books.30 As the study notes, on equating the
cost of books with the proportion of income they would form for an Indian
consumer with an American consumer, the American consumer would be
charged $440.50 for a copy of Arundhati Roy’s ‘God of Small Things’,
which is likely to raise a lot of questions. However, an Indian consumer
paying $6.60 for the same book would not be considered problematic, even
though the latter is the equivalent of the former by the proportion-of-income
argument.31 According to the study, if American consumers had to pay the
same proportion of their income towards such books as their African and
Indian counterparts, the equivalent prices would be ridiculous.32 These disparities are enormous, and the people worst affected by this are specifically
the ones who need access to education the most. They cannot and must not
be ignored.
Third, while the judgment of the Single Judge Bench allowed quite a
broad room for unauthorised photocopying, the judgment of the Division
Judge Bench is arguably more tempered. The judgment itself did not go into
28

29
30
31
32

Prashant Reddy, ‘Counterview: The Outcome of the DU Photocopy Case isn’t Necessarily
Good News for Higher Academia in India’ (SpicyIP, September 19, 2016), available at
https://spicyip.com/2016/09/counterview-the-outcome-of-the-du-photocopy-shop-isntnecessarily-good-news-for-higher-academia-in-india.html (Last visited on March 31,
2017).
Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to do?, 82 (Penguin Books 2010).
Liang, supra note 2, 206.
Liang, supra note 2, 206.
Liang, supra note 2, 206 (As of 2012, Nelson Mandela’s ‘Long Walk to Freedom’ would
cost $1027.50, while the Oxford English Dictionary would cost $941.20.).
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it in detail, but it limited the amount of photocopying to only that which is
necessary for the ‘purpose’ of the ‘course of instruction’.33 The Court did not
tell us how this necessity is to be ascertained, but it remanded the matter to
the Single Judge Bench to deal with exactly the same issue, and left it open
for determination. It explicitly stated that the issue of “whether photocopying of entire books would be a permissible activity” remained open to
determination, 34 and seemed to refer to the ‘yearly release’ limitation of the
Longman judgment35 with approval.36 This test remains open-ended at the
moment, but that is arguably no better or worse than the issue of pricing of
the photocopying being open ended.
Which brings me to my fourth point– the inherent assumption in this
market-based critique is that the market size would increase if charges were
attached to unauthorised photocopying. As long as this charge is limited to
a nominal value, it would arguably be viable from the access perspective
though the capital gained may not be too substantial. However, the fact is
that as far as the market for the actual publications in question is concerned,
a vast majority of the people, who can now access at least portions of them,
would not have been able to purchase the books in the first place. A large
number of people who would benefit from this exemption were not potential
‘customers’ to begin with.
The only change would have been that the universities or the students
would have had to pay a certain extra amount, nominal or otherwise, to
access even their courses in a country already suffering from hurdles in providing access to education.37 Where you have an absolute inability to afford
books coupled with a need to access the books, particularly for something
as vital as education, you end up with a positive effect on piracy. 38 And,
‘unable to afford’ is a very wide and critical category in India. Variations in
socio-economic status coupled with the massive population results in a lot
of people, particularly those especially in need of education, being unable
to afford even low-priced books. Furthermore, if the Court had accepted
the restricted quantum of fair use argued by the petitioners, the restrictive
33

34

35

36

37
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University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶
56.
University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶
79.
Longman Group Ltd. v. Carrington Technical Institute Board of Governors, (1991) 2
NZLR 574.
University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229, ¶
53.
Pheroze L. Vincent, JNU Slashes Research Seats, The Telegraph (March 22, 2017),
available at https://www.telegraphindia.com/1170322/jsp/nation/story_142010.jsp#.
WN5Uk76P-Mo (Last visited on March 31, 2017).
Liang, supra note 2, 209.
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effects would have been severely compounded.39 A potential argument, one
that the Court also makes, is that if more people can access extracts of
those books, there is a higher chance of them buying the books,40 especially if combined with access to education resulting in an improvement of
socio-economic circumstances.
And finally, fifth, it is still clear that the critique raises a relevant point,
and that the Indian academia can do with some incentivisation for publishers. However, the judgment marks important victories for educational
exceptions in copyright law, for the commons discourse, and for access to
education, and a necessary reshaping of the copyright discourse. If a method
of reaching this end, i.e., of making Indian academia more appealing, can
be found without rolling back this judgment to legally allow for publishers
charging on photocopying, it must be preferred in practice. Photocopying,
as a tool for reproducing content to support education, is a weighty tool that
should not be hampered simply because its effect was not predicted when the
laws were being conceived. It is important, of course, to incentivise the creation of academic works and to recompense the authors for the use of their
work. However, it would be better to approach this issue from the commons
perspective, as the Court has, and then buttress the incentivisation as much
as possible, arguably through a system of ‘contributions’ based on ability-to-afford, rather than to shift its costs onto those who are already struggling. For instance, a voluntary contribution system similar to the Creative
Commons system can be set up at Universities, or made available online; or,
alternative payment methods like the Patreon system can be considered.41
These methods would be much better than a legally mandated duty to pay,
which would necessarily increase the base costs associated with education,
but would still allow a method for recompense to authors and publishers.

V. Conclusion
While this judgment and the analysis herein are focused on the Indian context, it is important to note that the property-centric view of intellectual
39
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property is not an issue faced by India alone. Even in the education sector,
strong moves towards the chaining of academic research in terms of ‘property’ have been facing protests across borders.42This has been true even in
the West, with the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Authors Guild v.
Google similarly promoting a right to fair use, though in a different factual
situation.43
At the same time, the increasing severity and cost of paywalls and other
restrictions on access to academic works have been criticised across the
world,44 with Elsevier being the subject of much critique.45 Many academicians and activists have, in fact, gone so far as to oppose these restrictions by
making many articles available for free or creating tools for finding free versions of articles.46 Further, the consistently increasing support for the Open
Science and Open Access movements speaks for itself.47
We live in an era where technology allows us to share information at rates
that could barely be dreamt of decades ago. From massive computer with
minuscule processing powers, we have come to an era where any device can
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tap into the power of a literal, modern supercomputer over the Cloud.48 The
evolution of technology has led us to a democratisation of the means of content creation, with every individual now being capable of tasks that required
entire industries.49 Content creation, copying and reproduction are getting
easier every day across industries, and the easier it gets to ‘copy’, the harder
it will be to control ‘copying’. In such an era, a property-centric view of copyright can hobble the sharing of information and education from reaching
its true potential. It is important, therefore, to reframe the balance between
the private property discourse and the commons discourse in favour of the
latter, particularly in the context of education, so that we can ensure as
much access to information and education as is practically feasible. Putting
profit before educational access, in such scenarios, is very much akin to putting the cart before the horse.
At this point, it must be noted that the Oxford University Press, Cambridge
University Press and Taylor & Francis have withdrawn their suit after the
Division Bench judgment, and have stated in their Joint Press Statement that,
“We look forward to working even more closely with academic institutions,
teachers and students to understand and address their needs, while also
ensuring that all those who contribute to and improve India’s education
system—including authors and publishers—continue to do so for the long
term.”50
The recognition granted to educational exceptions, to the need for accessibility, in the Division Bench judgment counts as a momentous victory in
this regard. It is particularly important to note that the judgment adopts
a perspective on fair use that sees it as a right, and not as a mere defence,
which is a significant step forward for the commons discourse.
There are issues yet to be addressed, such as the test for what qualifies
as the “extent justified by the purpose”, which shall hopefully be dealt with
by the courts in the future in a similar view. Hopefully, this reframing of
the discourse will see a wider application in the Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) jurisprudence as a whole, particularly in other areas as or more crucial
than education, such as the pharmaceuticals industry.
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